The XXth Century Political History of Russia: lecture materials
Elena Kotelenets
Gennady Bordyugov
Sergey Devyatov
The XXth Century Political History of Russia presents lecture materials for academics working with undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate students as well as researchers of Russian history. The chapters are an unusual insight into the Russian past, which makes the readers think, analyze and also reconsider some events of the Russian history. It is an exciting blend of stories of the past and future trends, allowing to make forecasts and predictions.
G. Bordyugov, S. Devyatov, E. Kotelenets
The XXth Century Political History of Russia
Lecture materials
ebooks@prospekt.org
Информация о книге
УДК 94(47)
ББК 63.3(2)
В78
The authors:
Bordyugov Gennady (PhD), Head of the International Board of the Association of Researchers of Russian Society (AIRO – XXI). Since 1988, he has been teaching courses of History at Lomonosov Moscow State University. Since 1992 – invited professor at several foreign universities.
Devyatov Sergey (PhD), Head of the Department of Russian History of the ХХ – ХХl centuries at Lomonosov Moscow State University Historical Faculty, professor at Russian University for the Humanities and the Moscow Pedagogical State University. Invited professor at Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, National Nuclear Research University «MEPhI». Lecturing on Russian History, Historiography and the History of the Moscow Kremlin.
Kotelenets Elena (PhD), since 1977 – professor at Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia. Lectures on Russian History, Historiography and Political Studies.
Translation editor – Кupriyanova Мilana.
The XXth Century Political History of Russia presents lecture materials for academics working with undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate students as well as researchers of Russian history.
The chapters are an unusual insight into the Russian past, which makes the readers think, analyze and also reconsider some events of the Russian history. It is an exciting blend of stories of the past and future trends, allowing to make forecasts and predictions.
УДК 94(47)
ББК 63.3(2)
© Бордюгов Г., Девятов С., Котеленец Е., 2015
ООО "Проспект", 2015
PREFACE
In the middle of last century, many held that the 20th century marked the beginning of a Russian era. Others discussed a «Russian miracle», referring to the rise of the Soviet Union thanks to the communist idea. During the 20th century, Russia found an alternative to capitalism as a result of the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917. Industrial modernization and fantastic social mobility not only dramatically changed the image of the country, but also helped to win the mortal battle against Nazi Germany. After World War II, interest in the Soviet Union rose significantly all around the world. The communist idea was changing from a utopian idea into a palpable reality. Both common people and intellectual elites were awaiting the outcome of the «cold war» between the two systems of world order: the USSR and the USA.
«Free market capitalism» was drawing lessons from the world wars, crises, the Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s, and protests by left-minded youth in the 1960s. Meanwhile, «elements of socialism» could clearly be seen in the new course of Franklin Roosevelt and Ludwig Erhard, based on expanding state control over the economy and extensive social programs. However, new challenges, primarily caused by a scientific-technical revolution, did not prevent the West from turning to Reaganomics and Thatcherism – that is, to neo-liberalism – starting in the 1980s.
In Russia, the Bolsheviks resorted to violence as a tool of building a new regime and changing society and individuals. As a result, the country received a state-controlled economy based on the administrative mobilization of people and resources, the GULAG (labor camps), the Great Terror and intellectual isolation. Khrushchev’s «thaw» and Gorbachev’s «perestroika» were attempts to get out of the historical traps the country had fallen into as a result of lingering adherence to Stalin’s and Brezhnev’s views of socialism. In 1991, the country abruptly changed course, towards the restoration of a neo-liberal form of capitalism.
These lectures provide a new understanding and new vision of the dynamics of the historical process in 20th century Russia in all its complexity. They also explain why Russia, in spite of having enormous human potential and natural resources, faced such difficulties in development. Russia is portrayed as an integral part of world history, while at the same time its historical peculiarities as compared to both the East and West.
The articles and reference materials are addressed to our colleagues: university teachers and research staff working with foreign undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate students. They will also be of interest to people studying Russian history and to visitors and others who want to get a deeper insight into the Russia’s past while also learning about trends in the development and the chosen paths of Russia in the 20th century.
We are offering our interpretation of a people’s way of life and mentality, of a country’s power structures and regimes, economic policy models, and vision of the future as well as our view of key events of the last century. The book is based on lectures and reports delivered by the authors in universities and research centers in Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, the USA, France, South Korea and Japan.
INTRODUCTION
Theme 1
THE STUDY OF MODERN RUSSIAN HISTORY: MAIN CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS
The academic study of history has been significantly reconsidered and retooled during the last two decades. Scholars had to solve a whole number of questions. This process was accompanied by «the struggle for the past» and the filling in of so-called «blank spots», as well as by changes in the subject matter and value orientations of Russian scholars, the destruction of previously existing historical hierarchies, the beginning of coexistence between history and the Internet, market penetration in science and rivalry for the best «packaging» of historical knowledge.
The main reason for understanding the principle characteristics and trends of these transformations is to find out why historical science still attracts public attention in new conditions, and why it is used not only as science but also as a tool for making sense of current events.
Since the middle of the 1980s scholars have been studying Soviet history on the basis of the interests and priorities of Perestroika, elaborating historical patterns according to current political tendencies. While the official state policy was destroying the past, these patterns met the requirements of historical science itself. Researchers were clearing the historical research field of old dogmas and stereotypes. Nobody realized the possible pitfalls of this intellectual revolution. The review of the past was based not on historical science itself but on external factors. Political essays were filling the ideological vacuum. However, the approaches of popular commentators were more political than analytical. Historiography itself was only prepared to remove old concepts taken from Stalin’s Short Course and to replace them with others elaborated in the conditions of a new political situation.
The first animated discussions were actually aimed not at broadening historical science itself, but at «schematizing» it. Some researchers defended and wanted to conserve the old «patterns,» others wanted to destroy them. But neither group went outside the bounds of old stereotypes, stable traditions and claims to have a monopoly on truth. The result of these politicized discussions about the past resulted in a vulgar squabble over whether the country had been moving in the wrong direction for more then seventy years. At the least, this was a positive phenomena because the appearance of many «patterns» and explanatory concepts offered real choices and opened room for debate.
Some historians suggested looking for so called «big algorithms» (that is, large-scale structural imperatives of varying kinds – PTC) of Soviet history in the concepts that «had developed themselves» or penetrated Soviet historical science from western sociology. They could give a fundamental explanation of the historical phenomenon of Russia in the 20th century. These «big algorithms» include: «rapid economic development designed to overtake the West» or industrial modernization, «large-scale revolution», «the algorithm of empire» and the «doctrinal» algorithm. Behind each of them, there is a concept that had already been well elaborated in western sociology and historiography.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the «doctrinal» algorithm was the most popular. This approach reflects the recent past as the realization of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks initial political doctrine. It deals with the different ways Marxist concepts were adapted to fit the Stalinist political system. Today these ideas represent a specific Russian modification of the «totalitarian» approach developed by American Sovietologists of the «Cold War» period.
There are many facts and events in the history of the 20th century that could explain the first algorithm, connected with the modernization pattern, and the «big revolution» algorithm. As for the first algorithm, since the end of the 1960s political scientists had been elaborating concepts explaining the developmental particularities of the second-tier capitalist countries, including Russia. The second algorithm was used by the Bolsheviks’ opponents, such as the Mensheviks, the National-Bolsheviks and the Trotskyists. This algorithm was also supported by those scientists who doubt the revolutionary character of the October Revolution of 1917 and refused to include it among the «great revolutions.» Whatever the attitude toward the Russian revolution, this approach did provide a scientific interpretation of the political extremism, violence and terror that occurred. It also allowed historians to trace the revolution’s ascent, regression and decline – that is, its «Thermidorian» and «Bonapartist» phases. The same can be said of the «algorithm of empire,» which can also be used to explain the birth, development, and collapse of the Russian and Soviet imperial systems.
The «grand algorithms» at best could form a clear historical picture of social development as a whole, but they could not deal with the analysis of concrete historical periods. They cannot explain many seemingly particular questions. This means that we need some «crossover» from global historiographical schemes to particular historical descriptions. It is necessary to find the turning points, notably the periods of fundamental change in the historical interaction of the «big algorithms,» when some algorithms come to the foreground and become determinative and others disappear or become dormant.
For the description of past crucial and routine turning points we can use Hegel’s concepts of «epic» and «prosaic» world conditions. According to Hegel, in its development, society not only goes through various phases, but through comparatively concentrated periods of high social tension and concentrated contradictions as well. They indicate the «crucial moments» of history. Some «crucial moments» develop into «epic» phases leading to great social progress. Others become moments when tactical choices are made concerning ways and means to advance society. The analysis of critical moments allows us to understand how the very nature of societal movement is changing or might change, how social contradictions interact, and what the relative strength among the «grand algorithms» appears to be.
During a period of crisis or social confrontation, we see the destruction of the habitual patterns of mass behavior. We see political extremism spilling out into the historical arena, giving rise to an atmosphere of intolerance and confrontation. Unfortunately, we know far too little about these problems which are so significant for the comprehension of the phenomenon «Russia in the 20th century.» It is important to understand why some crises lead to liberalization of the regime while others lead to its regeneration on even harsher foundations.
Political mechanisms of solving social crises as well as forms of social consolidation and stability differ greatly in conditions of «open» and «closed» political life. Historians have only just begun to study the real causes of the appearance in Russia of the one-party dictatorship, its social functions and concrete historical forms.
The events of 1991 and 1993 intensified discussions about the methodological crisis and new types of historiography. Some scientists even invited their colleagues to follow the «totalitarian» approach for the reason that it had prevailed in the West over so – called «revisionists.» Others were convinced of the advantages of the «civilization»-approach (with its ideological neutrality) over the «stages of development»-approach. While political scientists debating, postmodernism began to dominate the foreground. Postmodernism cast doubt on the necessity of history as science. Earlier, society had been looking for universal historical concepts. Historians freely used such concepts as «people,» «class,» «nation,» «state» etc. However, by the end of the the 20th century, in light of the crisis of modernism, industrial and urban ways of life, and the collapse of many political and intellectual absolutisms, everything has changed. The present is no more a logical result of the forward march of history.
Some scientists saw the way out of crisis in a paradigm shift – the substitution of modernism, with its universal explanatory theories of social development, with postmodernism. Post-structuralism allows us to outline patterns of multidimensional and irregular change. Michigan University Professor P. (full name) Novik said that the «postmodernism era» had dissolved historical time in a diversity of texts and opinions. However, some western researchers (P. Novik, K. Lloyd, J. Applebee, L. Hunt, M. Jacob etc) did not view postmodernism as a new tool of intellectual analysis. On the contrary, they considered it a «tool of control over minds» like Marxism and liberalism. Postmodernism became a mind controlling tool rather than a new tool of intellectual analysis. According to the teachings of postmodernism, historical thinking is destructive, it interferes with the present. Since nothing can be repeated in the world, there is no need to know history. We have to free ourselves from the «burden of history.» Thus the former attractiveness of postmodernism (how to find the meanings and contradictions in a text) turned to an extreme.
The representatives of the «new historical science» justify the search for a new approach through an innovative interpretation of historical objectivity. Every science is based on the interaction of a qualified researcher with an object of investigation. History that can understand and explain the world may still be written (REWRITE). Unlike poststructuralists, practical realists emphasize the ability of words to articulate different forms of interaction between the researcher and object of historical investigation. We can admit that language is a formality, that historians use rhetorical means and that the past has been constructed. However, we can draw a line between the past and the historical view on the past. It may be useful to ask anti-constructivists how to find the hidden meanings in the text. Points of view may be different. However, documents and sources must be carefully checked by different historians. This will facilitate a more positive approach which allows us to locate valid interpretations among the rival opinions on the past (with the existence of different variants of history).
This approach is valuable because of its ways and forms of dealing with the object of investigation. Each generation of historians deals with it in a different way, using notions that are valuable during a concrete period of history. Each generation rewrites history. Meanwhile the historian – a qualified researcher – is not obliged to be an impersonal truth seeker. She must take her own traits into consideration: her character, nationality, gender, and so on. This self-awareness is already a real revolution in historical thinking. Seeking scientific neutrality and objectivity must not turn into a form of religion.
A discussion of new paradigms was seriously complicated by the emergence from underground of «national histories.» In the early 1990s they began to replace State-centered histories of the USSR, which were common at that time. The concept of «national» histories (as opposed to «Soviet» histories) began to predominate in politics as well as in educational systems.
We will try to find an explanation for these phenomena through the examination of the historical circumstances, of the process of so-called nationalization of the popular historical consciousness, through consideration of historians’ inclination for nationalism and elites’ tendency to instrumentalize the past. However, we should emphasize the fact that the concept of «national history» in its sociological meaning is nothing else but a system of knowledge, created by the national school of historiography. It shows varying degrees of ethnocentrism.
For example, the history of France is considered to be the history of the whole population, not the history of the nation as an ethnos. This means that it focuses on the history of the territory and the state (the principle of the «political nation») and less on the history of the formation of the population (of the Gauls, the Teutons, etc.). When it comes to «national» German history it means the history of all the Germans. The Japanese history known as «kokusi» means both the «native history» and the «national history.»
In Russia, «national history» is perceived as a system of knowledge which refers to the past of an ethnos and its cooperation with historical neighbors. The appearance of this concept was caused by the creation of the national idea, which justifies the cultural and political pretensions of the ruling classes. National historians of the Commonwealth of Independent States «change» the history to justify the process of the formation of independent post-Soviet states.
Some kind of rehabilitation of national history began in 1988. Criticism of such notions as «empire» and «imperial thinking» and later of the process of the formation of the Russian Empire as the series of Tsarist Russia’s crimes against peoples, caused in Russian society a peculiar guilt complex about its «imperial» past. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the modification of former complexes and pretensions. «Nationalities» were confronted by the co-existence of old and new identities, including national ones. This provoked an identity crisis and a desire to overcome Russia’s status of being on the historical and cultural periphery, of its role as a nation being driven by outside forces. People started searching for arguments to prove that their achievements were in keeping with the great patterns of world civilization.
Of course not every detail of the national life came to the fore. In the course of reconsidering «their» past, even historians approved of depicting their peoples as heroes and sometimes as victims, they were inclined to make their statehood more ancient, to exaggerate the level of political and social development of ethnic groups, to assert their nation at the neighbors’ expense, and to create a modified pantheon of the outstanding national figures.
Historical circumstances and the «nationalization» of popular historical consciousness automatically consolidated the historians’ inclination toward nationalist ideology and nationalistic movements. Moreover historians often became founders or supporters of nationalist doctrine. German, French, British and Japanese researchers tried to estimate and understand this phenomenon. They created historiography which could substantiate states’ ambitious aspirations. Even the evolution of nationalism became historical, especially when in the 20th century after World War I a new type of nationalism (ethnonationalism) appeared.
There are several stages in the evolution of the national idea in the USSR. Official historiography focused on a class-based and internationalist approach to historical problems. The term «nationalism» was used in a pejorative sense, as a political label to compare it negatively to internationalism. Meanwhile during the first decade after the October Revolution histories were being written in the atmosphere of cooperation between the central government and indigenous elites, which stimulated the nation-building process among large ethnic groups.
In the late 1920s, there emerged a contradiction between the Russian scientific community, which represented the official historiography of the USSR, and national historians of the other Soviet republics. National histories became the equivalent of anti-Marxism or deviation from Bolshevism. Stalin’s reign dealt a serious blow to national elites and cultures, which were consistently and systematically repressed and contained in the context of the assertion of Bolshevik ideological priorities. Stalin’s regime was concerned with the tension among intellectuals. Turning historiography into a way of substantiating Russian greatness was accompanied by the collapse of Lenin’s class-based historiography. The idea of «national» histories was a way to secretly preserve cultural orientations during this period. National historiographies came to function as part of an official Soviet historiography.
After Stalin’s death, political leaders of the country gave up trying to turn Russian patriotism into a total ideology and historiography. That period of time was characterized by reconstruction of the nation, the formation of new national elites and the search for national histories. The ideological system and official historiography supported the domination of the idea of Soviet patriotism.
In the late 1980s national histories obtained the status of official historiographies. A great myth about a new historical community «the Soviet Nation» began to disappear. It was replaced with new historical perceptions on the part of Soviet nationality groups. National histories now offered a way for up and coming political elites to assert themselves. The political elites of post-Soviet states had to create nations with great national traditions. This is why they needed myths that combined the old and the new.
Science has been studying myths for more than two centuries. Researchers began to realize that myths were a valid attempt to make sense of the world and they began to study myths as an important part of culture and a way to perceive people’s consciousness. Myths challenged ideology, and ideology in its turn started to use myths.
Schematization, simplification, simulation of complicated religious and social processes provides a basis for ideological systems (doctrines). Myths reflect rituals as well. Scientific theories try to make something clear through research, examination, and experience, while myths reflect canonical explanations. A theory tries to formulate a law, which is always open to challenge and falsification. A myth is not. It is ideal when myths and scientific theories are balanced. The predominance of myth is dangerous: it is much easier to manipulate people’s consciousness and actions when the irrational dominates (myths always use irrational proofs).
In Russia myths have not only been reconstructed, but have become a strange mixture of pre-revolutionary, Soviet and post-Soviet myths. They prevent us from approaching actual history, as ideology did before. These old/new myths operate as a support, identity, orientation, protection and demarcation. These functions are neutral but they can become positive or negative according to the situation. Myths can soften crises; they let us deal with all the contradictions and complications of reforms. However they can be used and they are used to achieve certain goals, to take people under control.
Political myths, myths created by and about the ruling class, are of great contemporary interest. They became a distinctive feature of the twentieth century. Political and ideological myths have a tendency to create imagery of a new reality, to determine people’s behavior. Sometimes history chooses as a leading myth a notion advanced by the authorities, such as «enlightened power» or the «power of an iron fist»; sometimes state ideology portrayed the country as a «united and indivisible Russia», or Moscow as the «Third Rome.» The USSR created its own «sacred history» with its own «precursors,» like the «revolutionary events of 1905», with its own predecessors («revolutionary democrats» of the nineteenth century), with its prophets, ascetics and martyrs, its rituals and ceremonies. The October Revolution provided an opportunity to create a new world. History then had to describe the fight against domestic and foreign enemies (the «continuation of class struggle»), and the «era of battles» (The Great Patriotic War). According to Soviet ideology, Stalin was not only the successor of Lenin, he was Lenin’s incarnation: «Stalin is Lenin today.»
It is important to stress that these non-traditional myths were made artificially. But it is pointless to debate whether a myth is «true» or not. As Roland Bart claimed: «the myth doesn’t hide anything, it doesn’t show anything, it’s characterized not by telling lies or the truth, but by diverging.» In other words, the basic principle of myth is to transform history from a record of the actual contingent actions of human beings into the unfolding of a preordained and determined process of nature.
The thesis that only the authorities set the range and define the norms and truths of knowledge was rejected during the last decade. Today history is not officially exploited by the State as a political instrument, although there have been many attempts to revival of Soviet tendencies to «protect» Russian history and of imperial or monarchic tendencies in public thinking.
New conditions of social and academic life, and new communication links, make it impossible to «usurp the past,» although the fight to do so still exists. Understanding the fact that historical science has a public nature strengthens the positions of amateur historians, who defend their right to speak and write about history. Many historians have resorted to «new historicism,» which demands «a more equal exchange between the two halves of a kaleidoscope facing the past» – between history and literature, as Russian sociologist Alexander Etkind has written. Overcoming barriers between the humanities, striving to get out of the «disciplinary ghetto,» and new opportunities for communication has provoked a discussion about the language with which to describe the past and about ascertaining the range of connections between different branches of science which analyze the past.
Theme 2
RUSSIA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 20TH CENTURY: ITS SELF-IMAGE, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION, AND CONTRADICTIONS OF ITS DEVELOPMENT
Russia
Russia entered the 20th century with confidence, based on its history and human, economic and political potential. Russia was second in the list of the largest countries with a territory of more than 22 million square kilometers, second only to the British Empire. The Eastern and Northern parts of the country bordered the Arctic Ocean, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea. Overland Southern and Western borders were interrupted by the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea. In the South, Russia bordered on oriental countries: Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and China. One-third of the territory of the country (50 guberniyas of Russia, Northern Caucasia and The Kingdom of Poland) was European, two thirds was Asian (Southern Caucasia, Siberia and Central Asia).
The first population census in the Russian Empire was taken at the end of the XIX century (January, 1897). It recorded 125,640,021 persons, the number of women (50.3 % of the population) was bigger that that of men (49.7 %). Age composition in comparison with other countries differed substantially; there were more children and fewer people of working age and older. About a half of the population was under 20.
To understand the population density (taking into account natural environment and peculiarities of historic development), we have to compare it with that of other European countries. For example, in France population density was about 83.1 people per square kilometer, in Germany it was 118.6, in England 155.7, and in Russia in 1897 it was about 6.7 and in 1910 it was 8.5. This figure compares only with the population density of the USA.
The peoples of Russia spoke 146 different languages and dialects, but the majority of the population, almost 80 %, was representatives of five peoples. «Great» Russians (Velikorossy) made up 44.3 % of the population (55.7 million people), «Little» Russians or Ukrainians (Malorossy) accounted for 17.8 % (22.4 million) and Byelorussians for 4.7 % (5.9 million). All in all it was 66.8 % of the population of the country. In addition, in the Russian Empire there was a large population of Poles (6.3 %, or 7.9 million) and Jews (4.2 % or 5.1 million).
Migration and colonization in some regions led to a large mix of races. Fifty percent of the population of the 50 Russian guberniyas and Siberia were Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians, in the Caucasus they were only 34 %.
Concerning other peoples living in the Russia Empire, the majority (10.8 %, 13.6 million) were those who spoke Turkic languages, the Tartars, Bashkirs, Azerbaijani, Turkmen, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Chuvash, Nogai, Yakuts and others.
The multinational population of Russia led to a complicated confessional composition. About 69.4 % of the population (Russians, Byelorussians, Georgians, Romanians, Finns and other northern nations) were Orthodox Christians. To the second group belonged Muslims (11.1 %) with Turko-Tartars and Caucasian mountaineers practicing this religion. To the third group belonged Catholics (9.1 %). They were Poles, Lithuanians and some of the Armenians. 4.2 % of the population practiced Judaism. To the group of small confessions belonged Lutherans, in particular Latvians, Germans, Finn, and Gregorian Armenians; Buddhists and Lamaists, Mongolo-Buryats, Chinese, Koreans, Japanese and northern peoples.
The population census in 1897 estimated that there were 2.2 million Old Believers and others who did not accept church reforms of the 17th century. However, some specialists think that in fact they were more than 20 million. As they were pursued by the Police and the Court, they concealed their religion.
The result of a century’s cooperation between the state and the various confessions was a decree «On Strengthening the Basis of Religious Tolerance» adopted on April 17, 1905. It guaranteed the right to freely change from one religious community to another, and with certain conditions from Christianity to non-Christianity. Old Believers and other schismatics were given equal rights with all the other religious confessions. It was also officially was forbidden to call Buddhists and Lamaists «idolaters» and «pagans.»
(Actually, when the Provisional Government came to power in February 1917, confessional policy was re-targeted at building a secular society in a religiously neutral state. After October, 1917, an effort was made to eliminate religion not only at the level of the state and public life, but from private life as well).
The population of Russia was divided into 4 «statuses» (with different rights and liberties): nobility, clergy, urban dwellers and country inhabitants. Urban dwellers were subdivided into noble citizens, merchants, bourgeois, and craftsmen. Country inhabitants consisted of peasants, Cossacks, petit bourgeois and artisans. At the beginning of 20th century, two parallel processes were taking place. On the one hand, there was the overall unification of social classes, their coming together and strengthening as classes. On the other hand, the overall class structure was rapidly decaying.
In terms of social structure, we have to take into consideration the fact that at that time about 76.5 % of the population earned its living in agriculture, 5.7 % in trade and transport, 10 % in industry, and 7.8 % in non-industrial activity, including education, medicine, science, and state service. One of the particularities of Russian social structure was its polarization. The upper middle class and landlords were numerically insignificant, while the majority of the population was small-scale owners and semi-proletarian layers. They comprised about 60 % of the population, and if proletarians are included the number rises to almost 80 %. That could not help but aggravate social contradictions in the country.
As is well known, Russia was one of those states trying to catch up in terms of economic development, but it was quite late entering the path of modern industrial development. The basis of this development was the appearance of industrial factories that exploited the labor of serfs who worked under the quit-rent system. In search for the money to pay this tribute, the peasants either had to search for work in the city or were engaged in small-scale craft production in the villages. This is how the textile industry appeared. It was the textile industry that catalyzed organic and autonomous industrial growth of the country. By the turn of the 20th century, the expansion rate of the economy was relatively high from the point of view of global standards. Russia belonged to a group of countries with quickly developing economies like the USA, Japan and Sweden. At the turn of the century, Russia was fourth or fifth in iron ore, iron and steel smelting, mechanical production, industrial consumption of cotton and sugar production. Russia was the leading country in oil production due to the development of the Baku oil production complex. The length of the railway system was the second in the world to the USA.
The economic crisis of 1899–1903 temporarily interrupted economic growth. Many factories were closed, but several fruitful years gave a new impulse to industrial development. After the crisis, monopoly concerns began to develop as syndicates and cartels began working in close cooperation with banks.
Thus, Russia at the beginning of the 20th century can be defined a semi-industrial country – that is, agriculture dominated over industry. Colonial holdings of Western European countries were separated from the metropolis by the sea. Russia was an empire where the metropolis and under-developed colonies were united in one territory and in one state. The European territory of the country accounted for about nine tenths of industrial and agricultural production. Clearly, however, at the beginning of the 20th century, Russia was just beginning the transition to a predominately industrial society.
Russia managed to make progress because of foreign business and investment. In this regard, the Empire was not different from other countries that were rather late to enter the path of industrial development and enjoyed the support of their rich neighbors. While not deprecating foreign investments, it was still national capital that was the determining factor in the economic development of the country. One of the most significant features of Russian monopoly capitalism, however, was the leading role of the state. The state determined the amount and distribution of government acquisitions, fixed taxes and privileges and controlled banks.
Russia entered the 20th century as an autocratic monarchy. The head of state was Emperor (Tsar) Nicholas II, a member of the Romanov family – a dynasty that had occupied the throne since 1623. His power was not limited by formal norms or public institutions. The Tsar relied on the Council of Ministers (a consultative assembly of policymakers) and on the State Council (supreme legislative committee).
Administratively, Russia was divided into 78 guberniyas, 18 oblasts and the Island of Sakhalin. There were administrative units that consisted of several guberniyas. They were called general guberniyas and were established mainly on the outer periphery of the empire. The Tsar usually authorized the Minister of the Interior to appoint the governor (Head of the guberniya). Guberniyas consisted of counties, oblasts, and districts. Further division was specialized. There were volosts (districts) for autonomous peasants, lots for land captains, lots for judicial investigators and so on. By the 20th century local government (zemstvo) had already been introduced in 34 guberniyas in the European part of Russia, in all other parts everything was under control of the state. The zemstvos mainly dealt with economic issues. They consisted of guberniya and district representative councils and an executive board. Elections to zemstvos were held every three years.
Bureaucracy was one of the most important elements in a monarchical authoritarian system. Often, due to his power, an official had extensive opportunities for personal enrichment. In spite of popular conceptions about Russian bureaucracy, the number of officials was not that great. If we compare the number of inhabitants in 1897 (129 million people) to the number of the officials (146,000), we see that for every 800 citizens there was only one official. (To compare, in the 1980s there was one governmental official for every fifteen people).
The political construction of the country outlined above had a corresponding specific ideological doctrine. As far back as in the 1830s, Count Sergei Uvarov (Minister of Education) called this doctrine «official nationality theory.» It was based on a three principles: Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality. The patriarchal basis of Russian conservatism and monarchism reflected Uvarov’s metaphor, and such views faced increasing difficulties fighting against rational liberal and social concepts.
More than 150 political (all-Russian, regional and national) parties supported different ideologies. They fell roughly into three groups: Rightists, Liberals and Socialists. The bitter dispute among them sharpened the key contradictions in Russia; resolving these contradictions was important for the further development of all the events in the country.
The disjuncture between the modern and archaic sectors of the economy (industry versus agriculture) was obvious. Capitalism in rural areas developed much more slowly than in cities and towns. Agriculture was inefficient, and although its productivity was increasing, Russia produced half as much bread per head as the USA and three times less than Argentina. The underdevelopment of agriculture slowed down capital formation, while the artificial attachment of peasants to land prevented the formation of a large and qualified working class.
Changes in the economy and the increasing complexity of the social structure conflicted with the class system, exacerbating national and social conflicts. State control over and interference with industrial production affected the Russian middle class, making it passive and restricting its political freedom and maturity.
Energetic economic growth was accompanied by rapid population growth. British historians A. Milword and S. Soul wrote: «Russia was a country of extremes in climate, luxury, needs, in primitive agriculture and modern steel-casting industry in Europe. Its population was growing so fast that all the efforts that could have been a success in other circumstances did not take proper effect.» Production per capita in Russia was less (2.5–3 times) than in the leading industrial countries, and Russia also lagged behind in labor productivity.
All this affected the level of civilization. It was defined not only by the culture of labor and life, but also by the educational level of the population. Only one fifth of the population at the beginning of the 20th century was literate. Medical care was also poor, and the mortality rate was almost twice as high as in Europe.
The political and religious elite not only tried to draw the attention of the supreme governing power and society at large to these mounting contradictions, but also called on people to take dynamic actions and steps toward reform that could head off social tension and avoid the dangerous consequences of potentially serious clashes.
Theme 3
FESTIVAL OF THE OPPRESSED OR SOCIAL DISEASE? THE NATURE OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONS
The only way to decode a thousand years of Russian history is to first unlock its root «code» of Revolution.
The First Revolution of 1905–1907 was spawned by the social and political crisis which had arose as a consequence of the disastrous Russian war with Japan. After the massacre in Saint Petersburg on the 9th of January, 1905 («Bloody Sunday»), peasant unrest grew; workers striked; the army and navy rebelled. Soon liberal and conservative parties appeared on the national stage. While the bourgeoisie insisted on liberal political reforms, trade unions and the Soviet of People’s Deputies demanded more radical action. Revolutionary parties (Social Democrats and Social Revolutionaries) sought the destruction of the entire regime. The «All-Russian» (that is national) October political strike and liberal’s slashing attack on absolutism forced Nicholas II to publish the October 17 Manifest which promised to guarantee certain political liberties and to create a «representative» State Duma. These promises gave the government enough legitimacy to marginalize radical political groups and quell the armed rebellions of December 1905 as well as the worker rebellions, taking place in Moscow, Rostov-on-Don, Novorossiysk, and Ekaterinoslav. But the government was not destined to enjoy peace for long. In 1906, along with renewed labor strikes, the peasants, the armed forces, and several ethnic minorities began to rebel. The so-called «Putsch of June 3» caused the dissolution of the Second State Duma; the first Russian Revolution had ended. Absolutism created new institutions which would be more loyal to the monarchy such as the Parliamentary Representative Office. It also began massive agricultural reform – introduced by Prime Minister Arkady Stolypin – by permitting the peasants to leave the commune (obshchina) for private farmsteads, thereby; it was hoped, creating a middle class citadel against the revolution. Furthermore, Stolypin encouraged mass migration to Siberia as a means of discouraging revolutionary activity. These reforms encouraged the development of Russian capitalism.
The February Revolution of 1917 was concerned with overthrowing absolutism and establishing a democratic republic in Russia. The Revolution was sparked by a grave economic and political crisis. The crisis was exacerbated by the military disasters of the First World War, economic dislocation, and food shortages. On the 23 of February, lack of food in St-Petersburg (renamed Petrograd) provoked anti-war rallies, protests and massive strikes. The General Strike started on the 24–25 of February; on the 26 of February the strikes developed into an open struggle with the army in Petrograd. On the 27 of February, the General Strike grew into an armed rebellion. The troops took the side of the rebellions. The Union of Labor and Soldier Deputies was created along with the Interim Committee of the State Duma. This formed the basis for the new «Provisional» government. On the 2 (15) of March, Nicholas II was forced to abdicate.
The October Revolution of 1917 was the result of slow and inconsistent actions of the Provisional Government headed by Alexander Kerensky. Of course, he also faced a complicated context of agricultural labor crises and national conflicts. The fact that Russia continued to participate in the World War exacerbated the nationwide crisis. As a consequence, the influence of the radical Left increased in the centre of the country and the influence of the Nationalists in the periphery. The most active party was the Bolshevist Social Democratic Party. The members of the party espoused the ideals of a Socialist Revolution in Russia which they thought would give an impetus for the Worldwide Revolution. The Bolsheviks proclaimed popular slogans: «Peace, to the people», «Land, to the peasants», «Factories, to the labor class». At the end of August – beginning of September, the Bolsheviks gained the majority in the Soviets of Petrograd and Moscow and proceeded to prepare for an armed rebellion, towards the opening of Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets. On the night of 24–25 of October (November, 6–7), armed workers, soldiers of the Petrograd garrison and sailors of the Baltic Fleet stormed the Winter Palace and arrested the Provisional Government. The Congress (the majority of which was built up by the Bolsheviks and left-side socialists-revolutionary) approved the overthrow of the government, passed Decrees on Peace and Land and organized the government, the Council of People’s Commissars headed by Vladimir Lenin.
The oppositional forces loyal to the Provisional Government were soon crushed. Soon the Bolsheviks established predominance in most industrial cities. The main adversary – the Kadet Party was outlawed and the oppositional press was prohibited. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks obtained only 25 % of the popular vote during the Constituent Assembly elections (November, 24 (12)). They dispelled The Constituent Assembly (Petrograd, January, 5 (18)) which refused to accept a number of demands of the Bolsheviks. This led to further splits and divisions in the Russian countryside, exacerbating the Civil War. The Soviet Government was firmly established in European Russia; it nationalized the banks and enterprises and wrapped up a truce with Germany. The Triple Entente countries tried to preclude Russia from disengagement and consolidation of Soviets authority. This is when the intervention of foreign countries started.
How do Revolutions begin? Theoretically, this is a trivial question. While searching for a non-trivial answer, it would be interesting to observe the behavior of the «leaders» on the eve of the revolution. For example, what happened during the Revolution of 1905? After much contemplation, Nicholas II signed the decree «The Outline for a Course of Government Perfection» on the 14 of December, 1904. In order to calm the nation after a number of defeats in the Russo-Japanese War Nicholas II promised to improve peasants life, to expand the rights of Zemstvos (district councils) and City Duma, to abolish press restrictions and to reduce the scope of emergency measures in inflamed regions of the Russian Empire (such as Finland). Nevertheless this document didn’t contain any information about real land reform, political liberties, or a new constitution. Several days before that, on the 9 of January, 1905, the Emperor and his advisors decided that people should be «taught a lesson» and be discouraged from complaining about lawlessness and hardships. It is well known that the rejection of the reforms turned into «Bloody Sunday», Moscow barricades and The Battleship «Potemkin».
Pavel Milyukov, a Liberal political leader and historian, was one of the main figures of the year 1917. He offered a scheme according to which the revolutions become inevitable:
– When the people urgently need a large-scale political or social reform;
– When the government is against peaceful settlement of the problem;
– When the government is no longer able to act by force;
– When the people not only stop fearing the government but also start despising it and laughing at it openly.
What Surprises Contemporaries in during Revolutions? All Russia’s Revolutions prove the famous Napoleonic phrase: «You cannot start or stop a revolution.» Therefore, it is little wonder that it is impossible to separate synthetically a political revolution from a social one. What is most surprising about revolutionary times is the rapid devaluation of democratic ideals, a phenomenon characteristic among both the «leaders» and the «masses.» There are clear reasons for this. For example, in 1917–1918 there were two forms of democracy: an «established» form which was based on Duma traditions and oriented towards European standards, and a soviet form which had never been practiced in history before. These two forms could not find any middle ground; first there was crisis and then they turned to ostensibly outdated systems of rule.
Thus the Soviet «democracy» turned to single-party rule based on military patterns. «Established» democracy, on the other hand, was forced to cooperate with and later comply to «white» generals with pseudo-fascist ambitions. As a result, the country had to choose not between two forms of democracy, but rather between «red» and «white» dictatorships.
But these realities were not well understood by contemporaries who analyzed events using highly emotional language to express their feelings about the revolution: «flood», «windstorm», «maelstrom», «hurricane», «explosion», and «ecstasy». «Purification» and «regeneration» – this is what was expected to be seen after the cataclysm. And even Lev Tolstoy, one of the most vigorous critics of violence, compared the revolution of 1905 with the birth of a new life and admitted that it was beneficial and creates an «abyss of good».
Thus, carried away by revolutionary enthusiasm, few paid any attention to the actions of The Black Hundreds or the appearance of a great number of adventurists – people without any past, with made-up biographies. But as time went on, the «dirty foam» of the revolution and the immorality of its participants moved to the forefront. The well-known Manifesto of the 17 of October, 1905 (which guaranteed Russia the main civil liberties and gave the country the Legislative Duma) evoked the massacres of «patriots» in hundreds of cities in 36 Russian provinces. During one month more than 4,000 people died and about 10,000 people were disabled in the course of The Black Hundreds pogroms. Universities and gymnasiums were under siege. Due to nonfeasance of the authorities and particularly Nicholas II, in many towns a terror set in.
During the months of February and March 1917, the cruel chaos grew: there were corpses of gendarmes with ripped open bellies in Petrograd, the mad chase of officers in Kronstadt, vigilante justice in Yelets. An officer Fyodor Stepun, a future philosopher and sociologist, described Petrograd of 1917:
«I thought that I would find it exasperate, magnificent, filled with revolutionary romantics… My impression was indeed strong but the opposite of what I expected. Petrograd – from the outside to the inside – presented an utter picture of dissoluteness, monotony and platitude. The town looked unusual and was definitely going through rough times. Endless red flags were fluttering in the air, but not as banners and colors of revolution, but, instead, they were hanging down along grey walls as dusty red pieces of cloth. A crowd of grey soldiers wearing shirts and greatcoats was drilling around grand squares and wide streets of the city, a picture obviously contradicting the scale and grandeur of the event. Occasionally, armored cars and trucks full of soldiers and workers passed by with noise: guns atilt, tumbled hair and angry, mad eyes. No, this is not the great idea of the revolution that I had heard about at the front, neither is it the nation desire to justify freedom, but its vile antithesis… This is a drunken joy that «the day is ours,» that we are making merry and not going to have to explain anything to anybody.»
«The source of true folk-spirit of the people» often produced something that didn’t comply with the primary ideas of the revolutionaries. The spontaneous socialism of the opposed contained not only constructive but also destructive principles. Those who had faced it were ready to put testify that the revolution «evokes in a person not only a beast but also a fool.» (Emigrant Sociologist Pitirim Sorokin).
One of the Bolsheviks’ leaders – while complaining about the economical crisis after October, 1917 – admitted regrettably that a worker turns into a pensioner of the state, into a parasite sponging on it. But this remark as well as many others was lost in the overall appetence to a new culture, a new man. Few indeed thought about the consequences and the costs of the revolution. There was no need to think about the past and the present when the old was being replaced by the new, when the «new man» was being formed.
The Russian Revolutions of the XX century have not avoided the destiny of The French Revolution: some people glorify them as a historical landmark in humanity’s liberation from oppression, others curse them as a catastrophe and crime; some consider the revolutionaries as saints, while for others they are monsters.
Is it Possible to Control a Revolution?
Sometimes a revolution is compared to an abdominal surgical operation, the charge that one has to pay for having rejected preventive routine treatment. At the same time drastic intervention can sometimes be the only guarantee of recovery.
The Twentieth century produced two paths towards revolution: either the current power regime quickly intercepts the initiative from revolutionists and extinguishes as soon as possible the flames of popular indignation, or revolutionists themselves fully bring their slogans to life. The revolution of 1905 made the government cast away its endless hesitation and doubts, stop talking and start doing. At that, a more radical reform project of a larger scale was chosen. The two greatest Russian reformers, Sergey Witte and Pyotr Stolypin, headed the Council of Ministers. During the revolution situation, they worked to simultaneously suppressed popular anger and rebellion, while conducting reform measures. In short, they followed the classical rule: if all forces are spent fighting the revolution, its consequences can be temporarily eliminated. But while, relying on force, if fundamental changes and reforms are implemented, the revolutions causes can be eliminated.
In 1905–1907, personal immunity, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of unions were declared, agrarian reform was put into practice, redemption of payments for peasants were cancelled, duration of military service was reduced, universities received their autonomy, fines for participating in economic strikes were abolished. But at the same time, there were dragoons and drum-head court martial to stifle mass rebellions.
After February Revolution of 1917, along with democratic changes the Provisional Government also initiated an institutional basis for forced measures. To settle the summer crisis of 1917 the Provisional Government instigated, for instance, armed food detachments, which withdrew bread from peasants in the villages. The Provisional Government based itself on the brutal examples of the recent past: food requisitions, on the basis of set prices in 1914; a bread allotment of November of 1916 on the initiative of Rittikh, the tsar’s land minister; and «soldier groups» for compulsory agricultural tasks. Thus brutality led to brutality.
The Bolsheviks having taken power in Russia continued orienting themselves towards world revolution – the new era, in which working people all over the world would unite in a single world-commune. From October 1917 until March 1918, Lenin and his entourage took pains to indicate the form of the new Soviet State system and its regime. This led not only to anarchy, but massive armed rebellions of an absolutely anarchical mood and vision.
A bewildering number of different institutions appeared («labor communes», federations of «labor communes»). Many of these institutions enjoyed some autonomy; they had their own councils of people’s commissars. Soon each of them considered itself the legitimate local power, accepting the decrees of the central power as they saw fit. The same slogan of expropriation of expropriators was understood as «steal what has been stolen», as an appeal to take piece by piece all national property back to one’s own houses, attics and cellars.
All of this could have been predicted. But in that case Nikolay Berdyaev could not have been amazed by the «superhuman efforts» of Lenin, who in the span of five months came from being a marginalized party functionary to leading a massive national transformation. He called for the communization of all property, discipline, responsibility, and a complete restructuring. He exposed revolutionary phrase mongering, anarchic tastes and making «conjurations over an abyss.»
Indeed the most pitiless truth was discovered in the spring of 1918: it was impossible to overcome the crisis in the situation when each province represented «an independent republic,» while there was individual and group egoism, and anarchy ruled the market. Nothing but strong central power was able to reestablish lost economic ties and revered tries with the countryside rehabilitate a broken financial system, establish order and discipline.
In their practical activity the Bolsheviks too resorted to force, but on a much more massive scale then ever before witnessed in Russian history. At first forced was used systematically only in the limited patches of the most critical areas of supplying food. These methods continued the authoritarian tendencies of the war period. However, from May-June 1918 – a period, when there was a threat of restoration and counter-revolution, the Bolsheviks openly choose the way of defending soviet «strength» by any available means.
It is clear that the gradual retreat of both revolutionaries and their adversaries into «emergency» policy of force and violence was preceded by a long chain of events. The question «Who was the first to start?» usually leads nowhere. It is important to define the logic of the escalation violence itself because only that type of knowledge can inform politicians of the dangers in their decisions and actions. Perhaps we could accept the thesis «any violence is evil.» But when social confrontation reaches the point of civil war, society disintegrates. At such moments enemies and adversaries are kept beyond the moral, they are considered «inhuman», to which common human standards don’t apply. Then mere statements on the immorality of violence cannot stop anyone.
Long lasting extreme conditions were beneficial for the bureaucracy and state machinery because they received ever increasing power. This was the situation in 1905–1907, but it was even more evident after October 1917, when the old party Guard consisting of professional revolutionists exhausted itself. When new groups, led by «the common man,» arrived, the question of whether Russia was actually ready for a new regime became acute. Holding important posts, «the common man» introduced a whole range of new understandings to professional revolutionary activity, most notably the golden age of bureaucracy.
When directly connected to different social groups, bureaucracy is not dreadful. It’s not dreadful even when people infected by some anarchical illnesses come to the front. But when «the common man» is in charge, bureaucracy, the eternal problem of Russia comes to the fore. In fact, as Nikolay Osinskiy wrote to Lenin in October 1919: «the people actually bringing the dry algebraic formulas (created by Lenin) into practice are either poor managers or good functionaries (and often even bad functionaries). Only «bureaucrats» work at the most important posts. For important jobs we have a large amount of those who «know how to be on good terms with others», without hurting them.»
In bureaucracy form dominates over content. Bureaucracy in Russia became not only archaism but in a way a compensating machine in conditions when superficial forms do not have a proper support in industrial or technological potential. The efforts to artificially maintain sagging quasi-socialistic forms required social power. It was the Bureaucracy and national security forces which came to embody this power.
Is it Possible to avoid the Catastrophe of Revolution? Often the history of revolution turns out to be nothing more than a code of notions about revolutions. These histories characterize the mentality of those who reconstruct history, rather than the real history of the revolution itself. It seems clear enough, however that the «mystery» of Russian revolutions lies in the passion for extremes, a hope and belief that at in one stroke all problems can be solved, that unwanted past stays buried, and right away something new will be created.
Only smart policy can resist the logic of Russian radicalism and maximalism. Where there isn’t enough of it, an extraordinary commissar or commissioner appears. Yes, Russian revolutionaries along with Saint-Just might: the nature of events themselves leads us to results that we never had in mind. However, before 1905 as well as before 1917, reality contained a large diversity of evolutionary paths. But most importantly, history demonstrates that Russia could have been reformed. These are the true reforms that can prevent catastrophic situations; they represent the best way to break the spirit of revolution and lead its energy in a peaceful direction without turning towards radicalism.
However, nowadays most historians admit that the link between revolution and reform is more complicated, than it was once believed. Reforms can prevent a revolution but in certain cases they can give it an incentive. Late or half-completed reforms may stoke the flames of revolution. To avoid this, one shouldn’t be scared into not recognizing defects in the system and the need for corrections. By looking for excuses – functionaries are to blame, local officials are to blame, overzealous bureaucrats are the problem – sooner or later the blame will inevitably concentrate on the state itself.
Revolutionary forces can be held in check not only by the state, but also by society. Society is not a rival of to the state but a partner equally responsible for finding solutions in critical situations. It is society that is able to exercise pressure on the authorities; society can bring about timely renovation of the political elite, create a system of renovation and control its functions.
Revolution cannot be cast away, no matter how much someone wishes to do so. The heritage of revolution is still in institutions of the present. The revolution is no longer seen as infallible. Yes, it is true that its image is now vague and unclear, but the symbols of revolution have not disappeared, have not lost their value, regardless of subjective intentions of those who wish to control the past and the present. The Revolution will always have adherents, who see in it the realization of such ideals as freedom, equality and fraternity of people and nations. The revolution will also have adversaries unwilling to forget radical tendencies. The question posed by great humanist Jean-Jaures remains unanswered: «Revolution is a barbaric form of progress. Will we have a chance to see the day when the form of human progress will be truly humane?»
Theme 4
EMERGENCY MEASURES AND THE «EXTREME EMERGENCY REGIME» IN THE SOVIET REPUBLIC AND OTHER STATE FORMATIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF RUSSIA, 1918‒1920
In 1917, a democratic republic with maximum political legality began to take shape. It was the first time that the state began to reject authoritarian mechanisms; retributive policies declined; police and the secret political police force «Okhranka» were disbanded. That was the moment when two alternative forms of democracy came into sight on the political arena: one of them was Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, an unofficial but highly legitimate body elected by workers, soldiers, and sailors to represent their interests – but it was untested. The other was the Provisional Government, which based itself on Duma (that is, parliamentary) traditions and embraced European models. This government promised to convene a «Constituent Assembly» in order to establish a new form of government for Russia. The holders of both types promised people to pull the country out of World War I and overcome the extreme crisis the country found itself in. Moreover, all sides promised to do so without resorting to a regime of so-called «high state of alert» based on the Statute on Measures to Protect State Order and Public Peace (the security law of August 14, 1881), the rules of which were so intimately known to the majority of territories of the Russian Empire since 1881.
History gave the possibility to test this crucial statement both to the Bolsheviks and their political opponents. Soon the idea of democracy lost widespread public support. The Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Government failed compromise or find agreement on basis issues, and subsequently found themselves in the state of crisis. Both sides turned to seemingly outmoded forms of authoritarian politics. The country had to choose between two kinds of dictatorship: «the Whites» and «the Reds», and not between two forms of democracy, based on either the Provisional Government or the Petrograd Soviet. Soviet democracy was transformed into a one-party militarized dictatorship.. The members of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly began to cooperate with, and later knuckled under to, the «white» restorationist generals.
In the Soviet Republic and new state formations that appeared on the territory of Russia during 1918–1920, this process was accompanied by the establishment of «firm authority.» Extraordinary forces played a certain role in this, but more than anything else the «emergency regime» that was announced by the ruling circles – quite consciously but without any real need – was put in place for the sake of keeping power in their hands. There was a certain synchronicity in this process, with both sides exhibiting similar tendencies. In addition, this process occurred despite doctrinal statements from each of the opposing forces that rejected such a regime.
What set apart the regime of emergency measures? First of all, it began the turn to mass terror as a form of governance, as a means of liquidating enemies, moral intimidation and suppression of any resistance. This process was inevitably cloaked in some appropriate ideological language («a threat of counterrevolution», «radicalization of the class struggle», «a threat to democracy», etc.). Part of the population was declared to be «enemies of the people»: they were double-dealers, betrayers, spies, diversionists, saboteurs. It meant that they were not «friends» but «foes,» and so any means were admissible in the fight against them. The «extreme emergency» regime also meant the suppression of regular governing bodies by extraordinary ones, and the simplification of justice through bypassing legal proceedings. In general, it enabled a particular style of leadership and empowered certain social groups.
The emergency situation (withdrawal from the World War, accompanied by demilitarization of the economy and demobilization of the army, famine, the threat of the restoration of the former regime, etc.) objectively called into existence the idea of a «firm authority.» This idea entailed a system of extraordinary bodies, which, according to Lenin’s order, were vested with full dictatorial powers; as well as progressive delegation of some emergency functions to a number of the regular state forces (for instance, to the People’s Commissariat of Communications and Provisions). At first this process was perceived as a temporary phenomenon, which no one associated with the Bolsheviks’ basic prescriptions. The staff of the extraordinary bodies was not numerous; their creation came with a proviso on the observance of certain conditions – they were to function under broad local control; they were to be temporary, local, and finally subordinated directly to Lenin, who was not seen as dictatorial.
The decree of The Council of People’s Commissars on November 22, 1917 confirmed the principles governing the activities of people’s courts and revolutionary tribunals, which had under their jurisdiction special committees of inquiry fighting against counterrevolution. They were elected by the Soviets, consisted of the chairman and two members and considered cases of counterrevolutionary misdeeds, speculation and anti-regime agitation. On May 29, 1918, under the jurisdiction of All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK), the Revolutionary courts martial (Revtribunal) was founded. It investigated cases of special importance. It was not unusual that the Soviets carried out judicial functions since the «bourgeois principle» of the separation of powers into legislative, executive and judicial branches was totally abandoned.
By the term «revolutionary justice» most Bolshevik chairmen did not mean equal justice for everybody, because, according to their opinion, there was no and could not be any justice in a class society. At the same time, until the summer of 1918, when the Civil War re-intensified, people witnessed mild sanctions being applied to the most evident oppositionists to the Revolution, such as release from custody on parole and conditional sentences, even as they also witnessed cruel lynchings, pogroms and slaughter. For example, in January 1918, Moscow courts passed out thirteen percent suspended sentences, while in the second part of the year, the number of such sentences mounted to 40 %.
On December 7, 1917, the decree of The Council of People’s Commissars established All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Speculation and Sabotage (the Cheka) to protect the gains of the Revolution. Felix Dzerzhinsky became the Cheka’s head. He made the relationship of these organs to law enforcement agencies clear in his inaugural address: «Do not think that I am seeking any forms of revolutionary justice; we do not need justice today. Now we have to fight, face to face, it is a struggle for life or death, who will win out?! I propose – indeed, I insist on organizing revolutionary slaughter of counter-revolutionary agents».
However, only three months later did the Cheka obtain the right to found local Extraordinary Commissions in provincial and district centers. The decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of February 21, 1918 – «The Socialist motherland in danger» – gave it the right of extrajudicial killing of «enemy agents, speculators, housebreakers, hooligans, counter-revolutionary propagandists as well as German spies.»
It goes without saying that there was nothing unusual in the formation of extraordinary agencies. However, there was one condition – that their activity should have been based on the people’s self-activity; emergency measures and corresponding bodies should have compensated for the failures and weaknesses of the Soviets. Under an authoritarian administration, special governing bodies take a different meaning and play a different role in the power structure.
In May 1918, the Bolshevik government found itself at an impasse regarding economic policy. It was impossible to establish a bread monopoly gently. External as well as internal military pressure had reached its critical point. In such conditions for their own sake the authorities made a conscious decision to go beyond the limits of simple emergency measures. They plunged themselves and the society into the «extreme emergency» regime. The commissars believed that only extreme measures, and not planned legal activities, could solve acute contradictions and transform them into something new. Provisional dictatorship was imposed; the VTsIK began to expel the Mensheviks, right orientated social revolutionaries and then left orientated social revolutionaries from the Committee. In his speech at the rally in Butyrsky district of Moscow, after the attempted assassination of Lenin, which took place on August 30, 1918, Nikolai Osinskii said: «All the bourgeois elements placed on record and taken under public supervision must be divided into three groups. We will annihilate the active ones and those who constitute a threat. The others will be clapped by the heels. The third group will be subjected to hard labor, and those who are not able to work will go to camps.
Little by little, such methods assumed an uncontrollable character. Moreover, extraordinary agencies did not yet have strictly determined prescriptions and legitimate principles regulating their activity. The committees of the poor (kombeds), food brigades (prodotryads), blocking troops (barrier troops), revolutionary tribunals and local authorities were becoming almost uncontrollable. Quite soon the Cheka formed its net in all guberniyas and uyezds (provincial centers); it gained the right of peremptory judgments on questions of life and death. In a number of offices it could even exercise control over the activity of local judicial bodies and subordinate local committees of the ruling party.
In their letters people asked Lenin avowedly and harshly: «Why has the dictatorship of the proletariat in local offices turned into a criminal dictatorship of lower class criminals?» «How come, that even on this great day, the day of the anniversary of the Great October Revolution, working people do not have any real rights and possibilities but have to fear the Cheka agents and their searches?»
The «extreme emergency» regime did not manage to strengthen the communist government. On the contrary it weakened it and generated a situation of anarchy. Neither the upper class, nor the lower class could control the activity of the other. A weak system of power was rapidly losing its social foundation. All classes of the society tired of the anarchy engulfing the country. Peasants and ordinary citizens had only one dream: order. The destiny of the Bolsheviks depended on the transformation of the «extreme emergency» regime into a strictly organized form of dictatorship.
Beginning in September 1918, one could record the reining in of some manifestations of the «extreme emergency» regime, first and foremost the use of mass terror as a form of governing. The emergency measures and agencies were also brought within bounds of the law and strict regulatory activity. Only with this strategy could they manage to win over the majority of the population and form a firm rear echelon.
The decrees of the IV All-Russian Extraordinary Congress of Soviets in November 1918 proclaimed amnesty. Local extraordinary committees lost the right to seize hostages, and consequently only the central office of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission was authorized to do so. A considerable number of hostages who had been seized before were freed. The committees of the poor (the kombeds) were eliminated. «Revolutionary law» came into force. All these decisions manifested the readiness of the Bolsheviks for a long-term war, as well as comprehension that they could not make war in the conditions of disorder and instability that marked the «extreme emergency» regime. In justifying the necessity of the aforementioned decrees, and primarily of the one concerning amnesty, the authorities wanted to demonstrate that they were sufficiently strong, and that they were ready to reconcile with all their enemies who would agree to submit to Soviet power.
On February 17, 1919, with reference to the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the VTsIK declared the transfer of the right of adjudication from the extraordinary commissions to revolutionary tribunals. But this did not mean that these measures put an end to the manifestations of the «extreme emergency» regime. The Cheka kept its full powers in the regions where Soviet power had proclaimed martial law, and in 1919 such regions prevailed. Revolutionary tribunals were not, and could not be, a model of justice. Extraordinary commissions issued their judgments at the end of a trial, and revolutionary tribunals examined the cases on the basis of these judgments. Moreover, members of extraordinary committees were required to be members of the revolutionary tribunals. Standing orders on the revolutionary tribunals, which were adopted by VTsIK on April 12, 1919, prescribed that they were to be governed only by the conditions of the case and revolutionary conscience while judging.
Revolutionary tribunals were formed in the Military Revolutionary Councils at the fronts, and in the armies and corps as well; they were called Military Revolutionary Tribunals. Not only military men and prisoners of war were under their jurisdiction, but all criminals who had committed crimes within the zone of military operations as well. The sentences were enforced immediately. Death sentences were executed after two days; their enforcement could be stopped by the corresponding Military Revolutionary Council.
All extraordinary committees underwent organizational changes. This was, perhaps, the main sign of a return to the regime of regular emergency measures. Indicative in this context were the warnings by Petr Kropotkin, the anarchist theorist, in his letter to Lenin dated September 17, 1918, that the extraordinary bodies were on the eve of a serious trial. Like all other theorists of the revolution, Kropotkin appealed to the experience of the French Revolution. He tried to show how the terrorists of the Committee of General Security (the National Guard) became its grave-diggers in 1794. His studies of the literature made Kropotkin conclude that along with the Committee of General Rescue and particularly with the Paris Commune founded in 1793, «along with this revolutionary force, which was already partly constructive, another type appeared that was a police force, presented by Committee of General Security and its police departments. At first, this police force that had achieved momentum during the Reign of Terror, demolished the Sections (agencies of the People’s Revolution that appeared in large cities – G. B.), then the Commune and finally the Committee of General Security itself,» he wrote to Lenin.
Kropotkin did not conceal from Lenin the reason why he needed to examine this period of history: «Your comrades/terrorists are about to do the same in the Soviet Republic.» The Russian people have a great reserve of creative potential. Hardly had these forces begun to rebuild life on a new foundation from the complete ruin brought on by the war and revolution, when «the police, with their duties imposed on them by the Terror, commenced their corrosive and pernicious activity». They paralyzed any kind of construction and appointed completely inadequate people. Police cannot be a «builder» of a new life. But nevertheless it was the police who were becoming the supreme power in all small towns and villages. «Where will such a situation lead Russia?» asked Kropotkin. «I believe it will provoke the fiercest reaction.» The first signal of understanding this danger was «The decree on the All-Russian and local extraordinary committees» adopted by VTsIK in October 28, 1918. The document stipulated the controlled status of the local Chekas and their subordination to the Soviets and executive committees. In January 1919, Political Bureaus replaced local extraordinary committees in the districts. They were headed by the chiefs of the local police departments. Beginning February 17, 1919, in accordance with the decree of VTsIK, the All-Russian Extraordinary Committee had the right to administer punishment only in regions under martial law.
However, regulation of the activity of all extraordinary committees as well as of revolutionary tribunals had an ambiguous character and in reality its effect was minimal. Their activity was directly subordinate to Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party through Dzerzhinsky’s office; to be more precise, it was subordinated to Lenin personally.
All of these contradictions in reforming the structure of the extraordinary bodies caused new surges of the «extreme emergency regime» throughout the Civil War. It would be enough to mention how they tried to solve the food problem of February and April of 1919, the summer punitive expedition of 1919 to Ukraine, the Crimean events in late 1920, and the events in Tambov guberniya in 1920–1921.
The dissolution of the Ukrainian Rada at the end of 1918 and the foundation of the Ukrainian State in place of the Ukrainian People’s Republic signaled the dictatorial tendency of numerous newly organized state formations which were out of Bolshevik control. «The law on the interim state structure of the Ukrainian government» vested hetman Skoropadski with dictatorial authority.
The situation in the North of Russia was almost the same. At the end of 1918, in Archangelsk, Soviet power was overthrown and a «socialist» supreme government of the North region was formed. The city was opened to the troops of interventionist countries. However, after a failed military coup undertaken by the «Rightists», contradictions between «democratic» authorities and the occupation administration finally led to the formation in early October of a new «neosocialist» Provisional government. Socio-political powers were reorganized toward the «Rightists» and a regime of «hard power.»
In August, political organizations such as «The Unity of Renaissance» and «The National Center» – masterminds of the «White cause» – formed a consolidated platform, the meaning of which was articulated in the following statement: «In the process of state formation and until the moment the state structure is completed, authority […] must be vested in an authorized, strong, and independent supreme body capable of acting. Its structure will consist of a directorate of three: a Commander-in-Chief of counterrevolutionary armies and two representatives of socialist and non-socialist movements».
When in September the destiny of the Committee of Russian Constituent Assembly members was called in question due to the activity of the Red Army, state power started to concentrate in Omsk. The Council of Ministers was deprived of its decision-making function, which was delegated to the Administrative Council. It embodied the heads of all ministries of the Siberian regional government and their deputies. On September 8, the Siberian regional Duma came under full jurisdiction of the Administrative Council, which even had the right to dissolve it.
At the same time Grishin-Almazov, a moderate defense minister, was removed from office and replaced by Ivanov-Rinov. The latter did not just quickly restore the signs and symbols of the former regime but also gave the army absolute freedom of action by his directives. The army was permitted to do with civilians whatever it wished. Any semblance of civilian control over the military was eliminated.
The Directory of Ufa shared the same fate. Finally, in September 1918, during a meeting of merchants and manufacturers in Omsk the following statement was announced: «We’ve seen all the political parties in power, but the only result has been the destruction of Russia. We need a strong reasonable authority with a heart of stone to keep Russia alive. Russia is at war, every piece of its territory is a theater of operations, so there cannot be two ruling powers, there has to be only one, and that one should be the military.»
It was Admiral Kolchak who was entrusted with the mission of creating a strong power structure. As a consequence of the coup d’etat of November 1918, he became Supreme Leader of the Russian State. He stated then: «They call me a «dictator» – so be it… I’m not afraid of this word and I always remember that from the earliest times dictatorship has been a republican institution. As well as the Senate of ancient Rome, which appointed a dictator to rule the country passing through hard times, the Council of Ministers of Russia named me to the Supreme Governor during the most difficult period of the state.»
The extraordinary bodies formed in Kolchak’s administration (under such generals as Denikin, Yudenich and others), strongly resembled «state power,» though under the generals’ jurisdiction. Military bodies played a particular role in the machinery of punishment and repression. Those military bodies were represented by front-line and military field courts, but particularly by the counter-intelligence agencies that appeared haphazardly and everywhere. These departments of military control never were as much applied as during the Civil War. They were created by the main headquarters, military governors, in almost every military unit, political organization and governmental authority. Like extraordinary committees in the Soviet Republic, they symbolized the lack of trust and suspiciousness that reigned all over the country.
Apart from a counterintelligence service, Kolchak formed special purpose police units. In March 1919, the agencies of «state security» were founded under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. They were attached to the regional governors; their purpose was to fight against political criminals. According to the law enacted in April, an enterprise or any other establishment using their private funds could hire «police teams» for their own protection.
The creation of special extraordinary bodies, such as Osvag (agencies controlling a web of informants under the jurisdiction of the head of the special Council affiliated to the Commander-in-Chief), was a peculiar feature of the southern armed forces. Besides fulfilling counterintelligence functions, it had to supervise the political moods of the population. Special committees of the Volunteer armies (the generals’ extraordinary agency) were also founded to examine the pre-revolutionary background of the officer corps.
«The Whites» exercised judicial authority as strangely as the Reds, despite official separation of powers. «Regular» law enforcement agencies of the new state formations as well as of regions freed from the «Reds» went by pre-revolutionary legislation, though with certain alterations. But they acted only after military field courts. According to the «white» court procedure, an arrested person’s case was to be examined within 24 hours. Then the prisoner, whoever he might be, was either released (in this case he was supplied with an appropriate paper) or executed by shooting.
According to the legislation of war time, the list of grounds for prosecution included such causes as Bolshevik party membership or a top rank or political post in the Red Army. However, according to G. William’s (a «white» emigrant) recollections about the activity of the Novorossiisk counterintelligence agency, it was «so very easy to get in that dreadful place that might as well lead you to the grave». All an agent needed to do to start a classic counterintelligence prosecution was to find out that somebody living in the Volunteer Army region had a nice (in the agent’s opinion) sum of money. Political loyalty of all common people was «questioned.» At the same time, senior officers at the front were above any suspicion. They were supported and protected by counterintelligence, the criminal investigation department, and state guards. From William’s point of view, it was that «throng» of protected officers that finally brought the Volunteer Army to destruction.
No state formation before, during or after Kolchak’s dictatorship could avoid manifestations of the extreme emergency regime. The Committee of the Constituent Assembly before its breakdown resorted to execution by shooting of disgruntled inhabitants of towns and villages. Lieutenant general Rychkov, who headed the social revolutionary military units in Kazan, announced the order that confirms this information after a demonstration of Kazan workers in September 1918: «In case of the slightest attempt to disturb the peace on the part of any social group, and particularly workers, in any district where it happens, we will open fire.» And indeed, working districts in Kazan were shelled. In October 1918, leaving Samara, the Committee of the Constituent Assembly sent a punitive detachment to the factory center Ivaschenkovo.
Eighteen rebellions, civil disturbances and manifestations of disobedience, which took place from August 1918 until August 1919, indicate what means the Interim Government of the North areas resorted to. In January 1919, General Miller arrived in Arkhangelsk. Extraordinary measures and Terror, including economic extraordinary measures directed against the local bourgeoisie, became his governing methods.
Admiral Kolchak frankly spoke about his first months in power. He said: «Dissatisfaction with the internal administration is caused by the illegal activity of the lowest government agents, both military and civil. The activity of the heads of local police departments as well as of special purpose units is openly criminal.» Local Cossack organizations, which were taking part in liberating Siberia in the autumn 1918, turned out to be virtually useless as a support for the authorities. Kolchak admitted that atamans Kalmykov, Semenov, Unguern-Shtenberg, Gamov, Annenkov’s detachments «easily assumed functions of the political police and created special counterintelligence bodies.»
These agencies did not have any link with prosecutor’s office. The land council of Primorie complained about the fact that Cossack detachments organized private extrajudicial killings of political opponents – that is, everybody they met on their way. The Semipalatinsk cooperative union formally protested against ataman Annenkov’s activity several times, giving a warning note that his actions could destroy the reputation of the Omsk government and threaten the common mission of reconstituting the Russian state.
Admiral Kolchak also complained about the fact that counterintelligence offices were formed on the pattern of those which acted in Siberia under the Soviet regime, though counterintelligence should be presented only to Kolchak’s headquarters. They did not manage to control and oppress outposts, barrier troops on the railroads, or commissars authorized to represent the commanders at the front.
With the help of a whole range of decrees Kolchak tried to put an end to numerous cases of illegal confiscations, abuse of authority and the existence of police torture chambers. However, six months after coming to power he had to admit that the «malicious evil that has been killing our state and military forces since 1914 has re-appeared and is spreading.»
Sensing imminent defeat, military leaders left no stone unturned. In many places, manifestations of the extreme emergency regime appeared in the rear of Kolchak’s army, initiated from the top. It is sufficient to cite General Matkovsky’s brief order concerning the slaughter of insurgents in the villages near Omsk revolting against Kolchak’s soldiers:
«I. To scrupulously search every armed inhabitant of villages in rebellion; shoot them at the scene as enemies and traitors.
II. On the basis of evidence obtained from the inhabitants, to arrest all propagandists, members of the Soviet of Deputies who helped to organize riots, deserters, sympathizers, and those who conceal rebels and to take them to the military field court.
III. To deport unreliable and depraved persons to the Berezovsky and Nerchensky regions, sending them to the police.
IV. To bring to court, impose harsh sentences, and apply death-penalties to local authorities who did not show adequate resistance to bandits, who executed their orders and did not take steps for the liquidation of the Reds using their own means and capabilities.
V. To demolish villages where repetitive rebellions have been organized with redoubled severity, up to their complete liquidation.»
«White» armies acquired deplorable habits under General Denikin. Robberies, brigandism and other crimes against property were not prosecuted, so they became an ordinary phenomenon. An honest soldier became a prowler. Mean motives and rough arbitrariness replaced political correctness and mere human decency.
The negative influence of these battlefield morals on the rear was particularly felt in the Crimea after the retaking of Novorossiysk. Here are prince Obolensky’s reminiscences: «One morning on their way to school, children saw dead people with protruded tongues who had been hung from lamp posts in the streets of Simferopol. Never before had Simferopol seen anything like that. Even the Bolsheviks tempered their bloody business without such demonstrations.» It turned out that it was General Kutepov’s order, his way of terrorizing Simferopol Bolsheviks. The local Duma passed an official objection, and the Mayor went to Kutepov to persuade him to immediately remove the corpses from the street lamps. Kutepov gave the following answer to the the petition to cease public executions: «I have never abused public executions, but the current situation forced me to fall back upon such measures.»
In his memoirs Denikin called this and other similar incidents «black chapters» in the history of his Army. He did not hide the fact that most of the counterintelligence offices, particularly in Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa and Rostov, represented hotbeds of provocation and organized plundering. A two-way struggle was organized against this kind of offence; on the one hand they fought the agencies themselves, and on the other hand they fought individuals. In the long run the General had to admit the inefficiency and tardiness of the struggle.
Baron Wrangell tried as well to put an end to the ills of the epoch of «voluntarism.» This is demonstrated by his orders from April 1920 to June 1920, which mandated the end to violence against people. On April 27, the Department of Justice was detached from the civil government to fight against criminality. A peculiar judicial measure was Wrangell’s decree dated May 11, which ordered administrative deportation to Soviet Russia. Governors and fortress commandants were authorized to resort to such measures under a prosecutor’s supervision. The counterintelligence agencies, which were brought under control, almost stopped brigandage and acts of outrage. Criminals were subject to harsh sentencing. In his order of September 14, 1920 Wrangell expressed the following opinion about the military court commissions formed for civil protection against robbery and plunder: «The whole population living on the territories occupied by the troops of the Russian Army respects and trusts these commissions and their activity; in the immediate battle area, where a civil governing machinery is not yet properly formed, people believe these commissions to be their only protectors and address them with all their complains and problems.»
However, there was another opinion. Ivan Kalinin, former chairman of the Don Army military court commission, related that «Wrangell’s commissions never did any good,» that «the leader’s intention to establish a kind of «White Cheka» for the eradication of the lawlessness went down in flames». Later on, Wrangell himself had to admit the inadequacy of the counterintelligence agencies’ activities and criminal investigation actions, whose operations, in his opinion, were lagging. He wrote that «the population was tired of the Bolsheviks; at first, people waiting for peace greeted and welcomed enthusiastically the progress of the Army, but toward November 1919, little by little they began to feel again the atrocities of robberies, violence and arbitrariness. As a result the front collapsed and the rear rose in revolt.»
Thus, the Civil War has added new chapters to the history of the emergency regime that plagued Russia for long decades of the 19th and 20th centuries. An estimated 8 to 13 million people died on the battlefield, and of diseases, starvation, and terror. By the end of the war, about 2 million people had left the country. The damage to the national economy amounted to about 50 billion gold imperial rubles, industrial production dropped to between 4 and 20 percent of its 1913 level, and agricultural productivity decreased by almost fifty percent.
Despite the assurances of the Bolsheviks and the Provisional Government and its allies to permanently eliminate a system of governance based on the tsarist Statute on Measures to Protect State Order and Public Peace, their regimes added new dimensions to those rules. The extreme emergency regime introduced by the «Reds» and the «Whites» left traces across the whole battleground of the Civil War. In General Denikin’s words, this regime «caused the people’s cup of sorrow to overflow with new tears and blood, and it blurred the colors of the politico-military spectrum in the minds of the population, erasing the differences between the Savior and the Enemy.» To tell the truth, from time to time the Bolsheviks managed to restrain the war and regularize activity in the rear, which helped the Army and assisted in repulsing the attacks of the enemy. In the long run, it affected the outcome of the Civil War in the Bolsheviks’ favor. Nevertheless, extraordinary bodies that were once considered interim proliferated to a huge degree and became a state within a state. It was becoming more and more difficult to keep them within strict bounds and to put them under the supervision of regular state bodies. The end of the Civil War and the transition to the New Economic Policy provided hope that there would be dramatic changes in the structure of state administration.
Theme 5
FROM «WAR COMMUNISM» TO THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY: CONTRADICTIONS OF THE NEP
The disturbances that struck Russia in 1914 reached their peak in early 1920s. Devastation of the industrial and transport sectors, fuel crises, strikes, demobilization, the revolt of the sailors of the Baltic fleet and Kronstadt: these are well-known manifestations of the general crisis. There are two phenomena, however, that more than others influenced the crisis situation. The first was the largest peasant rebellion since the times of Yemelian Pugachev. The second was the terrible famine that struck many regions of the country, mostly the Volga region.
Understanding the essence of the transition from the Civil War to peace requires analyzing the interconnection and correlation of the following phenomena: Soviet government policy, the peasant movement and the famine.
A new stage of the Civil War began in the summer of 1920. A peasant movement against the Bolsheviks, who did not want to change the policy of «War Communism» and its food rationing system (the system of surplus appropriation), spread to almost all provinces of Russia and Ukraine (the most notable rebellions were conducted by Makhno and Antonov). The struggle between peasants and Soviet troops was extremely severe. The struggle began in the context of the 1920 harvest failure and the surplus appropriation system that led to confiscation of more food from peasants than in 1918 and 1919.
So what could end such a vast peasant rebellion? Could it be the change of ration policy by the Bolsheviks, i.e. the replacement of the surplus appropriation system with an agricultural tax in kind? Or perhaps the military suppression of mass rebellions? Or simply famine?
Until recently, historians have regarded the adoption of the agricultural tax in kind as a political decision that made peasants immediately shift their alignment towards the Bolsheviks. But analysis of related documents does not provide any proof for this theory. It was only in central industrial provinces that most of peasants gladly accepted the adoption of agricultural tax in kind. People in other regions regarded it as a new form of surplus appropriation. The strongest resistance to efforts to collect the tax was manifested in Western Russia. Due to a severe crop failures in the South of Russia, the Soviet government made a decision to collect the bulk of the agricultural tax in kind from Siberia. Peasants’ resistance toward the tax collection was followed by punitive actions.
The agricultural tax in kind was perceived as another form of surplus appropriation in many Russian and Ukrainian provinces besides Siberia. This is a report of the State Political Directorate (GPU) made in October 1922: «Over two thirds of the crops will be gathered as the agricultural tax in kind in Pskov province. Peasants of Riazan and Tver provinces will starve if they are forced to pay 100 percent of the agricultural tax in kind. But it all pales in comparison to the incidence of suicides committed by peasants in Kiev province because of the excessive rates of the agricultural tax in kind.»
This is why the agricultural tax in kind did not really mean any relief for most of peasants in the situation of famine and economic chaos in 1921 and 1922, and therefore it could not have had a real impact on pacifying the insurgent peasants. The Bolshevik administration decided to crush the peasant movement. In Tambov province, for instance, regular troops under the command of Mikhail Tukhachevsky were deployed for this purpose. He issued a secret order in June 1921: «The remnants of defeated bands that fled from villages are gathering in forests. To immediately clear these forests I hereby command: Use poisonous gases in the forests where bandits are hiding, so that the poison cloud fills all the forest killing anyone hiding in it». Concentration camps were established in the province, families of insurgent peasants who refused to surrender became hostages, and their property was confiscated. But, after comparing various sources, we know that all these government steps were ineffective in suppressing the mass insurgency of peasants.
The scale of the famine of 1921–1922 in Russia and part of Ukraine surpassed by far that of all other famine disasters of previous decades. According to the Central Statistics Office (CSO) over 40 million people from 35 provinces suffered from famine in 1921–1922. According to information from the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture about 60 % of agricultural territories of Russia were affected by the disaster. Famine, and the diseases and epidemics that it provoked, caused over 5 million deaths. Thanks to the aid of overseas organizations – the American Relief Administration first and foremost – the death toll did not increase. The ARA provided food for 10.5 million people at the peak of its activity in August of 1922. Egregiously, this contribution of the United States in saving millions of Russian lives remains unrecognized— even by the current regime of the Russian Federation.
The famine catastrophe had a great demographic, economic, and social impact. The results of a new analysis of the situation in a number of provinces reveal a direct relationship between famine and peasant revolts. The famine was the determinative factor in the pacification of peasant revolts.
The urgent necessity to overcome the crisis and claims by peasants boosted the introduction of market and commodity-money relations. The new Land Code authorized the lease of land and the hiring of labor. Soon after that the agricultural tax in kind was replaced with the unified agricultural tax mostly paid in cash.
With the introduction of the market, private traders appeared in the national economy. The state aimed at privatization of handicraft, small-scale and (some time later) medium-scale industry. The leasing of state companies and licenses to operate (a special form of lease) were authorized. Cooperation was promoted. Industrial companies under the Supreme Council of National Economy were allowed to form trusts. They operated on the basis of self-support, self-finance and self-repayment. Universal labor duty was abrogated, and the system for equal remuneration of labor at state companies was cancelled. In-kind compensation (rations in kind) was replaced with wages. The rationing system was finally cancelled.
Industrial management was decentralized. The number of branch central offices for industrial management was dramatically decreased. The National bank was created to regulate and revitalize finances. It had the right to issue chervonetses (bank bills backed by the gold standard) instead of devaluated Soviet rubles. The ruble became a convertible currency in Russia and abroad by 1924.
These swift and profound changes in economic policy took place at the same time as important steps in state construction. The state of disunity that had followed the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917–1918 was replaced with a movement toward unification; it resulted in the creation of the United Soviet Socialist Republics in December, 1922. The Russian Communist party played the central role in the unification movement and the creation of a union of equal Slavic (Russia, the Ukraine, Byelorussia) and Transcaucasian republics (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia). The Central Asian republics (Kirghizia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenia, Tajikistan) joined the union in late 1920s.
In 1923/1924 the Constitution of the USSR was adopted, the USSR government was created and the second chamber of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR was assembled.
The New Economic Policy led to an economic upturn. Agriculture and related branches of industry started to develop. Commerce contributed to the process, creating a nation-wide market. Social stratification began at the same time. The mass of the population began to envy the prosperous life of kulaks and the city bourgeoisie.
The policy was confronted with its first crisis in 1923; it was the «crisis of sales.» At that time, industrial prices were adjusted according to the needs of the countryside. But the desire to get the highest profits possible provoked a rise in prices of industrial goods by more then three times in relation to prices for agricultural production. The unevenness of prices led to a decreased spending capacity in rural areas. The government intervened in the price formation and administratively lowered industrial production prices and increased prices for agricultural production.
The reconstruction process was over by the mid-twenties. However, it was substantially influenced by a reduction in military spending. The armed forces, for instance, were reduced to 600 thousand people from 5.3 million people. Yet the future of the Soviet Union depended on the activity of capitalist powers. A perception of increased military threats could influence the further support of the NEP.
In 1925 the government decided to move towards industrial modernization of the country to place it among developed countries, making it capable of defending its borders. The industrialization program required an increase in grain exports to purchase necessary machinery and equipment.
The new phase of NEP began at the same time as the intensification of the power after the death of the founder of the Soviet state Vladimir Lenin. Leon Trotsky started to actively criticize the expanding bureaucracy because administration functionaries were appointed directly by Joseph Stalin instead of being elected by the people. And since Stalin was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the party became the only institution providing access to the nomenklatura. The nomenklatura was to become the basis of Soviet state organization. But Trotsky’s «new course» was based on the idea of free discussion of any issue. He believed that the old guard of the party was turning into a group of «new-style bureaucrats» who had forgotten the language of the revolution and were adopting a «party-style» of speech. This fact made it necessary to replace the old functionaries with new ones.
This was also the moment when Stalin advanced the theory of «Socialism in One Country» – that is, that a socialist regime could be established independently in the USSR. Other party leaders, such as Grigorii Zinoviev and Leo Kamenev, disagreed. They argued that socialism could only triumph if the Western European proletariat revolted as well, which meant in effect a «world revolution.» They regarded Stalin’s theory «national-bolshevist,» implying that it was more nationalist than socialist.
In 1927, with the tenth anniversary of the October revolution at hand the struggle among party leaders became more intense. Besides personal ambitions it was also driven by objective reasons. The NEP had not completely succeeded; it did not reach down to the production collectives – the fundamental components of the economy. Industry could not continue to exist without active state support. Workers demanded an administrative guarantee of their interests, and over a third of the peasantry (proletarians, half-proletarians, and the poor) were directly supported by the government’s intervention in the economy. Tax policy was based on the class principle. The same principle was applied to the elections to different levels of soviets. The bureaucracy became the indispensable component of every sphere of life.
The preceding analysis demonstrates that the country was nearing a historic choice between further pursuit of the NEP and an increase in the centralization of and administrative interference in all domains of state policy. Not only did the new crisis of the NEP reveal all of these contradictions; it also changed the direction of Russia’s development in the 20th century.
Theme 6
NEP DOWNSIZING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE POLICY OF EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES INTO A PERMANENT SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
The end of the 1920s – beginning of the 1930s was a period in which the policy of NEP (New Economic Policy, 1921–8) was overthrown in favor of the Stalinist «revolution from above.» It is extremely important to understand in what way and by what means the Leninist principles embodied in the NEP were revised and replaced by a purely Stalinist understanding of the course to be taken in advancing the country further and strengthening the new, post-Leninist regime.
In December 1927, at its XV congress, the ruling party adopted a program concerning the smooth «reconstruction» of the NEP. This Program envisaged the involvement of peasants in cooperative production on a scale realistic for that time, and was orientated towards a gradual, balanced, carefully considered tempo for industrial modernization, the strengthening of ties between city and countryside and, most important, the retention, to quite a considerable extent, of individual peasant ownership as the basis for the development of the agrarian sector of the economy and the market. At the same time the resolutions adopted by the Congress permit us to judge quite precisely the serious ideological changes that had occurred in the position of the ruling party. If the idea of socialism, as a system of civilized cooperatives, survived in the resolutions of the Congress, it was present only in an extremely reduced and stunted form. In one of the principal documents, «Concerning Directives on the Drawing up of a Five-Year Plan for the Economy», repeated mention was made of the need to overcome the anarchy of the NEP market and to set up a stricter framework for its operation. In general the market was seen in a very negative light; indeed it figured in the document only in one capacity, as the private market. The market was seen as a capitalist leftover, an attribute of capitalism as such, and was judged accordingly. Moreover, the process of overcoming the anarchy of the market was seen, in the long run, in terms of transforming the system of government regulation of the market into «an apparatus for the socialist distribution of goods.»
The redefinition of socialism implicitly adopted at the Congress strengthened the orientation towards strict centralization and a strictly regulated economic system. It might be said that the ideological shift towards the idea of «state socialism» had begun, but it was still envisaged at this stage as existing within the context of the market, which for doctrinal reasons naturally aroused hostility.
These ideological maneuvers were soon transferred to the practical plane with the occurrence of the grain procurement crisis at the end of 1927 – beginning of 1928. The immediate cause of the crisis had been mistakes in the economic administration, in particular the reduction of government grain prices at the beginning of the procurement campaign. In the winter of 1927/28 the largest granaries effectively ceased selling grain to the cooperation and to state purchasers. Hoping for more favorable market circumstances, and more advantageous conditions for selling, the «middle peasants» too began hoarding grain. The main point, however, was that both concrete tactical mistakes, and a fundamental strategic miscalculation, came together in the procurement crisis of 1927/28.
Analyzing the causes of the crisis in retrospect, Nikolai Bukharin concluded that the grain problem had already been neglected in the period from 1925 to 1927. The country’s leadership, including the General Secretary of the Communist Party, Iosif Stalin, had «for some period of time failed to take heed of the state of affairs with regard to grain, and for some time carried on with the process of industrialization, which was financed by foreign currency reserves and taxes.» Instead of paying attention, during the previous years, to the situation of the grain sector and achieving a significant increase in the rate of construction, on a firm basis, in one to three years» time, the leadership ran into inevitable difficulties, Bukharin observed. These difficulties became even more evident when the very sources on which we had been relying for some time were exhausted and we all realized that we could no longer continue on that basis. This moment coincided with our greatest problems. But once things had worked out in that way, once these difficulties had become an objective fact, we ended up in the first round of extraordinary measures.
From the very beginning a certain group within the leadership was inclined to see the outbreak of the grain procurement crisis in war-like terms, as a fresh attack on socialism by petty bourgeois elements, as a «kulak strike», an attempt to push apart the limits in which the dictatorship of the proletariat had placed capitalist elements, although in actual fact it was the market that resisted the grain procurements. All the evidence suggests that the Party leadership did not initially intend to apply the extraordinary measures over a long period. Exiled in Alma Ata, Lev Trotskii saw these measures generally as «a crutch for Rykov’s policies.» Probably, this was the view of all the members of the Politburo, who unanimously supported the extraordinary measures at a meeting on 6 January 1928. At that moment, the Party leaders simply failed to see any other solution. All other alternatives for overcoming the problem were rejected.
The extraordinary measures undertaken in the winter of 1928 proved completely ineffective. In the summer of that year, the government was forced to spend its mobilization reserves and purchase grain abroad. Six months earlier such measures would have been sufficient to put out the crisis and buy time for a serious review of policy. But the resort to extraordinary measures set in motion the machine of chrezvychaishchina and for the first time since the end of the Civil War the system of forcible purchasing of grain was reinstated. That section of society whose existence depended on the NEP, and who regarded it as the only possible normal form of economic and political life, was hit particularly hard by this policy.
These people were distinguished by their inner orientation, their political and sociopsychological outlook. Some of them were ossified, bureaucratized chinovniki, resistant to change of any kind; others were principled supporters of the NEP, while yet others favored organic economic growth rather than the various zigzags of the left. In the eyes of the leadership they constituted a force for historic inertia, and as such became the butt of the extraordinary measures. Their active or passive resistance forced the Party leaders from time to time to demand ideological controls and a purge of the Party organization. However, millions of non-Party people had spontaneously formed their own ideology, one remote from complex Party doctrine. It was expressed in the question: who is responsible for the fact that a year ago everything was more or less all right, while now everything is deplorable and unbearable? The Communists, the Komsomol, the Jews – such was one answer given by these despairing and embittered people. Others blamed the «would-be bourgeoisie», or the kulaks. The search for «enemies», the attempt to personify the guilty, became a kind of safety-valve through which mass dissatisfaction, both among city workers and among the rural poor, could be expressed.
The Shakhtii case, dubbed by Stalin «the economic counter-revolution», became the mechanism through which this question, matured in the minds of millions, took form. The «case» arose in March 1928, and the trial took place in May that year, that is to say, during the period when mass discontent and bitterness at the extraordinary measures had swollen into open indignation. The «Shakhtii case» was quite obviously fabricated, but its significance lay in the fact that it gave rise to the theory of «wrecking». This theory allowed the Party to point the finger at «concrete wrongdoers» and deflect mass dissatisfaction away from the Party leaders. The reaction to the «Shakhtii case» in the consciousness of the masses was quite simple. Statements of the following kind, made by peasants and workers in relation to the Shakhtii specialists, can be found in numerous political summaries and research surveys issued by the OGPU: «The bullet was too good for them, they should have been sent to the crematorium alive».
Support for the Shakhtii trial and the inferences drawn about the «wreckers» remained a stable socio-psychological phenomenon over a period of several months. Against the background of growing economic problems, extraordinary measures, queues and strikes, practically no one expressed any doubt or skepticism concerning the judicial correctness of the trial in the «Shakhtii case». On the contrary, among the lower strata of the proletariat the conclusions of the trial were taken to savage extremes:
What should be done? That’s for the Party Central Committee, our guide, to answer. Probably we should take up our knives and bullets again and get rid of all these famous doctors and generals, those that are still alive.
Thus in the spring of 1928 this growing social aggression was offered a personal target: the «wreckers». But the first target had already been named in January, when blame was laid on the kulaks who had organized the «grain strike». In this way a specific ideological and socio-psychological mood was created, which to some extent filtered into the Party’s ranks as well. Attempts were made to overcome the reluctance among many Communists to «activate», in carrying out the extraordinary measures, Party «radicals», who at the slightest difficulty would pose the question: «Isn’t there a Shakhtii plot here?» – a reluctance that was put down to degeneration and demoralization among the Party ranks. But if facts of this kind were occasionally made known to the whole country, the political struggle which occurred among the Party leadership in March 1928 was carefully concealed from the rest of society.
Bukharin, in particular, characterized the external and internal situation of the country as «very grave». The program of the XV Congress of the Communist Party was effectively torn apart by the crisis. Bukharin did not admit this directly, but his view was made evident in his demand for a new «overall plan» and the admission that the Party leadership had behaved worse than «superempiricists of the crudest kind». The failure, or at any rate partial failure, of the program of the XV Congress— instead of the smooth «reconstruction» of the NEP, the country had been dragged into crisis – was also obvious to Stalin. But he did not share the forebodings that the extraordinary measures would inevitably lead to civil war. By contrast, Bukharin considered his main task to be that of proving the real danger of civil war and the need for urgent and public repeal of the extraordinary measures. The anti-crisis programme of the «right faction», set out at a key moment in the plenum of the Central Committee in July 1928, was quite simple: the repeal of the extraordinary measures, an increase in the purchase price of grain, the abolition of the ration system, differentiated taxes, and so on.
In the key speech to the plenum, delivered on the Politburo’s orders by Anastas Mikoyan, it was emphasized that the Party had no intention of transforming the temporary extraordinary measures into a permanent policy, since this would threaten the alliance of peasants and workers, the stability of the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist construction. With regard to the extraordinary measures even Lazar Kaganovich declared: «They must not be brought into the system… It is all the more necessary to declare a decisive struggle against an ideology that wants to legitimize distortions».
Nevertheless Aleksei Rykov observed, first, that Kaganovich, in his speech, had identified administrative with economic measures, proof of which could be found in the restriction of the law of value in Soviet society and in the fact that bourgeois economy was perceived as the opposite of the Soviet economic system, and, second, that he had called for effort to be put into denouncing «distortions», rather than into considering the further application of the extraordinary measures themselves, or into analyzing the actual results of the grain procurement campaign. In a word, the plenum left a wide margin for very different interpretations of official policy. It is not accidental that members of the Central Committee repeatedly ask ed for clarification: to be precise, «what was the strike about?» The extreme left faction found the answer in the situation of the collective farms, the extreme «right» in the thesis «look to the market», still others in the development of individual peasant ownership. Under these conditions it was extremely difficult to imagine precisely how, and under what slogans, the next grain procurement campaign of 1928/9 would be conducted.
It was all the more difficult to predict the further course of events because the July plenum had seen the emergence of a faction that was far to the left of Stalin. The position of this faction was expressed, in particular, by several secretaries from regional committees: «Our task is not to stamp out the hatred of the poor towards the kulak, but to organize it.»
Vyacheslav Molotov also attempted to give a theoretical foundation to the events of the winter and spring of 1928. He accused those who forgot about the real class basis of the crisis of committing a sin against Marxism. Thus there formed within the Central Committee a group that was orientated towards the use of very harsh anti-NEP measures. And although Stalin himself took a more moderate position, he made a number of theoretical and political gestures towards the new left. This appeal to the far left was manifest, for example, in the theory of «tribute», that is, an additional tax which he proposed should be imposed on the peasants, and which the state would need to levy on a temporary basis in order to preserve and develop further the present tempo of industrial development. The following pronouncement was typical of Stalin’s utterances at the plenum:
«Our policy is not a policy of inflaming the class struggle… but that is not to say that the class struggle has been abandoned or that it – this very same class struggle – will not become more acute.»
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